from soph : keep those questions handy, they can become a FAQ we can share eventually
Ratio and Distribution of Slashed Stake
- Original: 50% burn and 50% reward
Prevention of Proposer Taking Whistleblower Reward
Possibilities:
- Pool of validators running in “slashing mode” that will share the slashed amount
- The leader would not be in “slashing mode”, thus would be not possible for it to be part of the slashing pool
- Soph : what about a community address similar that can be decided by the validator community what to do with it ? (ie similar as the fee collection or the emission split)
- Soph : what’s the issue for the proposer to take the reward ?
- What about whoever detects and announce the double signing to get the reward ?
More Question from soph: 1) what happened once a validator is detected of double signing ? Is he directly being force taken offline ?
2) What if the proposer is the one double signing ?